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ABSTRACT 
When the Federal Arbitration Act was signed into law in 1925, none would have 
guessed it would be used to perpetuate a system of silence surround workplace sexual 
harassment.  With the Supreme Court’s continued stance to liberally applying the 
Act to uphold arbitration agreements contained within employment agreements over 
the past decades, it is apparent that any change needed to protect vulnerable workers 
will need to come from federal legislation.  The rise of the #MeToo movement across 
the nation, and throughout various employment sectors, may be the push needed to 
bring about the necessary change. 
INTRODUCTION 
“It's a dream to be an employee there, . . . [a]nd then you find out what it really 
is, and it's a nightmare.”1  Over the years, with the resurgent wave of feminism and 
female empowerment across the country, a new issue has surfaced in the workplace 
and the field of employment law.  Sexual harassment in the workplace has always 
been an issue and litigated in the courts for decades.  Its surge to the forefront of 
American thought stemmed from the 2017 #MeToo movement that had very subtle 
and soft-spoken beginnings.  But what began quietly has grown into an international 
movement to highlight the prevalence of sexual violence and harassment in the world 
today, not just in the workplace.  
In a broad sweep, the “Me Too” movement highlighted the issues many women, 
as well as some men, face in the world today.  But focusing more specifically, the 
Me Too movement has revealed an issue within the realm of employment law: the 
prevalence and effects of workplace sexual harassment.  Traditionally, sexual 
harassment claims are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
outlaws sex-based discrimination in the workplace.2  Mandatory arbitration 
agreements have created an issue for employees who look to bring claims.  These 
agreements are found in employment agreements and contracts workers are required 
to sign in order to gain employment. 
This Comment will discuss: (1) the history of arbitration and sexual harassment 
law; (2) the issues many workers face due to these agreements; (3) the effects of the 
Me Too movement on the legal field surrounding these issues; and (4) the possibility 
for legislative solutions to these issues.  
In Part I, this Comment will discuss the federal statute governing arbitration 
agreements, the Federal Arbitration Act, its purpose, and effects. This Part will 
discuss the evolution of the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting and applying the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in a variety of fields.  It will narrow its focus on 
the Court’s growing approval of arbitration and its expansive interpretation of the 
Act.  Even more, it will discuss the Court’s application of the Act to employment 
agreements, where the Court has upheld arbitration agreements that waive employee 
rights under many different statutes.  
                                                                                                     
1 Stephanie Zacharek, Elaina Dockterman, & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Time Person of the Year 2017: 
Silence Breakers, TIME, Dec. 18, 2017, at 14. Included in the Time’s Person of the Year cover story, 
this quote explains the plight of female workers who experience sexual harassment in the workplace.  
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).  
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Part II of this Comment will discuss the jurisprudence surrounding sexual 
harassment claims.  It will discuss the inception of such claims under Meritor Saving 
Bank v. Vinson and the development of the doctrine in subsequent cases, including 
the strict framework under which a claim can be brought.  Additionally, it will 
discuss the transformation of employer liability and the creation of an employer 
affirmative defense.  
Part III of this Comment will discuss the impact that arbitration agreements have 
on employees.  It will discuss the statistical findings of scholars and researchers on 
the increased use of these agreements over the past few decades and their current 
estimations on how many American employees are covered under such agreements 
today.  Additionally, it will evaluate the effects these agreements have on the number 
of claims brought, in comparison to federal and state employment claims, as well as 
the success and outcomes of claims that are forcibly arbitrated.  
Part IV of this Comment moves on to the inception and development of the Me 
Too movement and the effects it has had on the field of employment law.  It will 
discuss studies conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) on the prevalence of workplace sexual harassment and the effects such 
harassment has on employees.  Additionally, it will examine the wide impact that 
sexual harassment has not only on victims, but the harms felt by society as a whole.  
Furthermore, this section will specifically discuss the impact of the Court’s decisions 
favoring forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims on employees, which peaked 
with the Court’s decision in Epic Systems v. Lewis, in May of 2018. 
Part V of this Comment will discuss a solution to the issues currently facing 
employees and employers alike, federal and state legislation.  This section will look 
at the proposed federal legislation, the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual 
Harassment Act of 2017 and the FAIR Act of 2019, as well as a collection of 
individual state legislative attempts.  This Part will discuss the push for these in light 
of the Me Too movement, and how the Court’s favorable precedent will bear on the 
effectiveness of these attempts.  
 I.  BACKGROUND ON THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISIONS 
Prior to the passage of the United States Arbitration Act, commonly referred to 
as the Federal Arbitration Act.  American courts, like their English counterparts, had 
a general aversion to arbitration agreements and routinely refused to enforce such 
agreements.3  Arbitration agreements are defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as: 
[a]n agreement by which the parties consent to resolve one or more disputes by 
arbitration.  An arbitration agreement can consist of a clause in a contract or a stand-
alone agreement and can be entered into either before a dispute has arisen between 
the parties (a predispute arbitration agreement) or after a dispute has arisen between 
the parties (a postdispute arbitration agreement or submission agreement).4 
Understanding the growing need for efficient solutions to contract disputes, 
Congress enacted the FAA, which was signed into law by President Coolidge on 
                                                                                                     
3 See H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924). 
4 Arbitration agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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February 12, 1925.5  This Act displaced much of the Court’s precedent and, as 
desired, “place[d] arbitrations agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts.’”6  The language of the statute states: 
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.7 
The Supreme Court determined in 1983 that the FAA should be construed as a 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” and that the “effect of the 
section [was] to create a body of federal substantive law . . . applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”8  
The modern arbitration process consists of six steps, if fully completed.  First, 
cases are initiated by one party bringing a claim, allowing the opposing party to 
respond, once they become aware.9  Next, arbitrators are invited to serve on the case, 
requiring such person to check for any conflicts.10  Third, the parties are made aware 
of the selection and are allowed a period of time to object to the appointment before 
continuing to the next stage.11  Fourth, the parties together address the preliminary 
issues and exchange information.12  Fifth, at the hearing stage, the parties have their 
chance to present their case to the arbitrator, similar to a trial but without the 
applicable rules of evidence.13  And finally, after the hearing the arbitrator releases 
their written decision, which contains the outcome and any award that may be 
granted.14 
Understanding the Act in a wider context of the law is important to understand 
that the FAA has been applied to many other areas as well.  A long and expansive 
line of precedent grew from this liberal interpretation of the Act.  Over the next few 
decades, the Court held that the FAA allows for expansive congressional power 
                                                                                                     
5JON O. SHIMAIUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30394, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1-2 (2003). 
6 Id. at 2 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924). 
7 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2017) (emphasis added).  
8 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
9 Stages of the Arbitration Process, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_Stages_of_the_Arbitration_Process.p
df [https://perma.cc/CJ8Y-UTM6] (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. This is comparable to the discovery stage of a trial. 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
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under the Commerce Clause,15 and preempts states laws against arbitration.16  In 
addition to these holdings, the Court held that an arbitration clause within an 
employment agreement was valid, even though it involved a statutory claim under 
the Age Discrimination Employment Act (“ADEA”).17  
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the plaintiff, a securities 
representative, was “subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement in a securities registration application.”18  Believing he was fired due to 
age discrimination, Gilmer filed a suit in the District Court for the Western District 
of North Carolina.  The defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was 
denied by the court because the ADEA was meant to protect from the waiver of a 
judicial forum.19  The Fourth Circuit reversed the court’s decision, stating that 
“nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purpose of the ADEA 
indicat[es] a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.”20  
The Supreme Court, granting certiorari, addressed the issue of whether statutory 
claims under the ADEA could be arbitrated, rather than litigated in court.21  The 
Court explained that “the burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of judicial forum for ADEA claims.”22  To prove such an intent, 
Gilmer must have shown that either the text, legislative history, or underlying 
purpose of the ADEA was in conflict with compulsory arbitration.23  The Court was 
unpersuaded with Gilmer’s contention that compulsory arbitration was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the ADEA.24  Relying on Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court reasoned that the deterrent effect and other broad 
social purposes of the statute are equally as effective if arbitrated, “so long as the 
prospective litigant may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum.”25  
                                                                                                     
15 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). In a case concerning a pest 
removal contract containing an arbitration agreement, the Court reasoned here that the phrase “involving 
commerce,” included in the statutory language, indicates that the Act was meant to apply to all contracts 
that affect commerce. Id. at 273.  Additionally, the Court reasoned that in combination with the broad 
language used, its own interpretation of the Act’s broad reach supported its holding. Id. at 274. 
16 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  The Court determined that that California statute, 
which made arbitration agreements that required “waiv[ing] compliance with any provision of this law 
or any rule” void, was in direct conflict with the FAA and therefore violated the Supremacy Clause. Id.  
The Court reasoned that legislative intent of the statute was to favor arbitration, and therefore the Act 
created federal substantive law that is applicable in both federal and state court. Id. at 12.   
17 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).  
18 Id. at 23.  
19 Id. at 23-24.  
20 Id. at 24 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (W.D.N.C. 1990)).  
21 Id. at 26-27.  
22 Id. at 26.  The Court clearly stated that statutory claims may be subject to arbitration agreements and 
supports its statement by citing to multiple cases that have applied the FAA to statutory claims 
including: the Sherman Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and Securities Act of 1933. Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 27.  Additionally, the Court was unpersuaded by the argument that arbitration would undermine 
the EEOC’s role in enforcement of the statute. Id. at 28.  It reasoned that “nothing in the ADEA 
indicates that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all employment disputes.” Id. 
25 Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
(1985)).  
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In his final argument, Gilmer asserted that arbitration is in conflict with the 
ADEA because of the ever-present unequal bargaining power between employers 
and employees.26  The Court quickly dismissed this claim, stating that “[m]ere 
inequity of bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.”27  
In his dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the FAA does not cover arbitration 
agreements contained in employment contracts of any kind.28  He reasoned that 
although the issue was waived below, the Court should have reached the issue of 
coverage because “the resolution of the question is so clearly antecedent to the 
disposition of this case.”29  To support his claim, Justice Stevens reasoned that few 
would argue that the main concern of the FAA was to enforce arbitration agreements 
between business entities, and for the “further extension of the principle of 
commercial arbitration.”30   
In addition to these arguments, the dissent rejected the majority’s reasoning that 
compulsory arbitration does not directly conflict with the congressional purpose of 
the ADEA and that unequal bargaining power should not limit the enforceability of 
an arbitration agreement.31  Nearly ten years later, Justice Stevens’s argument that 
the FAA does not apply to contracts of employment was explicitly rejected.32  
In Circuit City Stores v. Adams, the Court held that the FAA applied to all 
contracts of employment, exempting only employment contracts of seamen, railroad 
workers, and other similar types of transportation workers.33  In the case below, the 
Ninth Circuit had ruled that Section 1 of the FAA excluded all employment contracts 
due to the language of the statute which stated “contracts of employment of . . . any 
other class of workers engaged in . . . commerce.”34  The Court was unpersuaded, 
instead reasoning that explicit references to seamen and railroad employees limited 
the statute’s exemption to only those lines of employment.35  More specifically, the 
Court reasoned that because Congress used the phrase “engaged in commerce” the 
language should be understood as previously interpreted, meaning “engaged in the 
flow of interstate commerce, and . . .  not intended to reach all corporations engaged 
in activities subject to the federal commerce power.”36  To rule otherwise would 
contradict the liberal interpretation of the statute’s reach and favoring of arbitration.37  
                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 32-33.  
27 Id. at 33.  
28 Id. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The themes discussed in Justice Stevens’s dissent will be echoed in 
the dissents to come, authored by both him and other Justices.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Report of the Forty-third Annual Meeting of the ABA, 45 
A.B.A. Rep. 75 (1920)).  
31 Id. at 41-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
32 See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  
33 Id. at 114-15. 
34 Id. at 114.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975)).  
37 The Court also ruled, in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., that the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
under the FAA does not bar the EEOC “from seeking ‘victim specific’ relief on behalf of the 
employee.”  Shimaiukuro, supra note 5, at 6.  The Court reasoned, although the EEOC was not a party 
to the agreement, it “has the authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum that the 
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More recently, the Court has addressed the issues of class action and federal 
preemption under the FAA.  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held 
that the FAA preempted a California state law that outlawed arbitration agreements 
that required individualized arbitration because they were deemed to be 
unconscionable.38  The Ninth Circuit ruled that Section 2 of the FAA, which permits 
arbitration clauses to be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exists at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” does not preempt the California state 
law because unconscionability of a contract is a valid defense that exists at law for 
all contracts.39  
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court relied on its growing line of arbitration-
friendly precedent.  It reasoned that the liberal interpretations favoring arbitration 
continue when considering state law implications.40  They stated that “when state 
law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is 
straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”41  In making their 
determination the Court discussed the purpose and advantage that underlies the 
desire for arbitration – efficiency.42  If consumers were allowed to demand class 
arbitration ex post it may create inverse effects to arbitration including: sacrificing 
informality, requiring procedural formality, and increasing risk for defendants.43  
These risks are inconsistent with the purpose of the FAA and the growing precedent 
developed favoring arbitration over litigation.  
The dissent in AT&T Mobility delivered an opposing position on the interaction 
of the FAA and California state law concerning the defense of unconscionability for 
contracts.  Justice Stevens explained that “California is free to define 
unconscionability as it sees fit, and its common law is of no federal concern so long 
as the State does not adopt a special rule that disfavors arbitration.”44  He continued 
by arguing that no rational person would bring an individual claim, when potential 
attorney’s fees could be much higher than a possible thirty-dollar award.45  He 
reasoned that “nonclass arbitration over such sums will also sometimes have the 
effect of depriving claimants of their claims.”46  In a final argument, the dissent 
reminded the Court that “‘[t]o immunize an arbitration agreement’ . . . on grounds 
applicable to all other contracts ‘would be to elevate it over other forms of 
contract.’”47 
Two years later, the Court again addressed the issue of arbitration clauses that 
limited class actions. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 
“[r]espondents brought a class action against [American Express] for violation of the 
                                                                                                     
employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 295 (2002).  
38 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).  
39 Id. at 339.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 341.  
42 Id. at 348.  
43 Id. at 348-9.  
44 Id. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. at 365.  This is an argument that the dissent in Epic Systems will address.  It will become relevant 
to the discussion in Part III of this Comment.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 366 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1929)).  
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federal antitrust laws.”48  They claimed that “American Express used its monopoly 
power in the market for charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates 
approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards.”49  The Court of 
Appeals found that the clause could not be enforced due to the prohibitive costs 
respondents would incur if compelled to arbitrate individually.50   
In determining that the waiver was enforceable, the Court again cited its 
precedent favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.51  It further 
supported this line of reasoning by citing to a 2012 case, CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood, which held that the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration should be 
upheld so long as it has not been “overridden by a contrary congressional 
command.”52  The Court held that the waiver of class arbitration was enforceable – 
explaining that neither the anti-trust laws nor Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were contrary congressional commands.53  The Court also reasoned that 
this waiver was enforceable because, similar to Mitsubishi Motors, it did not 
eliminate a party’s right to pursue the statutory remedy provided to them.54 
Posing similar themes and theories in this dissent as past dissents, Justice 
Kagan’s main argument consisted of the idea that, due to the terms of this arbitration 
agreement, pursuing an anti-trust claim would be a “fool’s errand.”55  The dissent 
based its argument on the idea that no court would “enforce an exculpatory clause 
insulating a company from antitrust liability . . . even if that clause were contained 
in an arbitration agreement.”56  From there the dissent explained that the arbitration 
agreement, while not baldly exculpatory, had the same effect and therefore should 
not be held enforceable.57  Furthermore, the dissent considered this to be consistent 
with established precedent, reasoning that “an arbitration clause will not be enforced 
if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves 
its result.”58   
Most important to this argument is the attempt to explain the repercussions of 
allowing just agreements to stand. While the right to arbitrate or litigate as a class is 
not a right, it is a procedure to be used when – even within the arbitration setting – 
due to the prohibitive costs of litigation, it would be impractical to bring individual 
claims.  
Lower courts are now divided on another issue regarding mandatory arbitration 
agreements.  In a recent decision, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)59 
                                                                                                     
48 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013).  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 332.  
51 Id. at 233.  
52 Id. (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012)).  
53 Id. at 234.  
54 Id. at 236.  
55 Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
56 Id. at 241. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 242.  
59 “The National Labor Relations Board is an independent federal agency vested with the power to 
safeguard employees' rights to organize and to determine whether to have unions as their bargaining 
representative.  The agency also acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by private 
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ruled that an arbitration agreement that waives class or joint actions is unenforceable 
under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).60  In response to this, a circuit 
split occurred, with some ruling that the NLRA protects workers from such clauses,61 
and others finding the FAA mandates that these agreements be upheld.62  
Circuits that ruled that mandatory arbitration clauses within employment 
contracts that contain class and joint action waivers are unenforceable reasoned so 
based on Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  Section 7 states:  
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any 
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an 
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) of this title.63 
Under this section, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the NLRA established that it 
is an employee’s right to act in concert with his fellow employees, including the right 
to bring work related claims in concert.64  The court ruled that these rights cannot be 
limited by an employer under Section 8(a)(1).  Furthermore, the court held that the 
“FAA does not dictate a contrary result.”65  It reasoned that because the agreement 
contained the phrase, “separate proceedings,” it illegally targeted nonarbitration 
proceedings, limiting workers’ rights to bring collective suits in court as well.66  
When defenses like illegality are applied to arbitration agreements the court held that 
the agreements should be treated on equal footing with all other contracts, and found 
unenforceable if law or equity requires such a result.67 
To the contrary, other circuit courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s FAA 
precedent to uphold class waivers in arbitration agreements.  The Fifth Circuit, in 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, held that the class action waivers are enforceable under 
the FAA rather than the NLRA.68  The court rejected the NLRB’s reasoning that the 
NRLA is applicable under the “savings clause” of the FAA, and that “when a contract 
                                                                                                     
sector employers and unions.” NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
60 In re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012). 
61 See Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 
1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774 (2014).  
62 See Cellular Sales, L.L.C. v. N.L.R.B., 824 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013, 1021 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th 
Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 299 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also 
Stephanie Greene & Christine N. O’Brien, Epic Backslide: The Supreme Court Endorses Mandatory 
Individual Arbitration Agreements - #TimesUp on Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. OF C.R. & C.L. 43, 54 
(2019).  
63 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).  
64 Morris, 834 F.3d at 982-3.  
65 Id. at 984.  
66 Id. at 985.  
67 Id. See generally Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the NLRA to an 
arbitration agreement limiting class and joint actions in an employment context, holding that the FAA 
does not prove contrary); Murphy Oil, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774 (2014) (same).  
68 D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 362.  
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interferes with the NRLA, the NRLA prevails.”69  The circuit court reasoned that 
only a contrary congressional command to override the FAA would be sufficient to 
find this agreement unenforceable.70   
On this point, the court held that the NLRA contains no specific language nor 
was there any congressional intent to override the FAA.71  Additionally, the court 
reasoned that like other statutory rights, the FAA still allows for vindication of those 
rights, even though they cannot be done collectively, and that mere unequal 
bargaining power is not sufficient to find these types of arbitration agreements 
unenforceable.72  This circuit split led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari for three 
case, Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., Morris v. Ernst & Young, and Murphy Oil v. 
N.L.R.B., and consolidate them into a single case.73 
During the May 2018 term, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Epic 
Systems, in an opinion authored by the newly appointed Justice Gorsuch.  In his debut 
opinion, Justice Gorsuch, on behalf of the Court, addressed the issue of the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements that ban class actions, under the “savings 
clause” of the FAA and the NLRA.74  All three cases dealt with employees, who in 
their employment agreements consented to arbitrate any disputes that might arise 
between them and their employers.  More specifically, the employees agreed to 
individualized arbitration hearings, effectively barring class arbitration.75  
In this consolidated case, the employees alleged violations of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.76  Rather than bringing their grievances through the agreed upon 
arbitration process, the employees challenged the validity of their mandatory 
arbitration agreements in federal court, claiming it violated the NRLA’s collective 
action provision.77  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “the 
[FAA’s] ‘savings clause’ removes this obligation if an arbitration agreement violates 
some other federal law”; that “other federal law” being the NLRA.78  
In rejecting their reasoning and reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court stated that, 
“[i]n the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing for 
individualized proceedings.”79  The Court provided two lines of reasoning to support 
its holding.  First, the court addressed the issue of the FAA’s savings clause; and 
second whether or not the NLRA sufficiently overrides the congressional intent of 
the FAA and commands the Court to “hold [the] agreements unlawful yet.”80  
Discussing the savings clause, the Court rehashed much of the precedent 
discussed above.  Relying on American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
Court stated the “Arbitration Act requires courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce arbitration 
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agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the 
parties choose to arbitrate their disputes and the rules under which that arbitration 
will be conducted.’”81  In relying on this reasoning, the Court rejected the proposition 
that the NLRA is grounds that exists “under law” to find these agreements 
unenforceable.82  Furthermore, the Court explained that its established precedent, 
while allowing invalidation due to “generally applicable contract defenses, such as 
fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” does not save “defenses that target arbitration . 
. . by . . . ‘interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.’”83 
Moving on, the Court addressed whether, in its text, the NLRA has a “clear and 
manifest congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act and outlaw 
[arbitration] agreements like [those at issue in the case].”84  The employees argued 
that the NLRA guarantees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection” and therefore is a clear and manifest congressional 
command.85   
The Court held that this was a not a clear and manifest command because not 
only “does [it] not express approval or disapproval of arbitration agreements,” it 
never mentions “class or collective procedures.”86  The Court explicitly stated that 
“[i]t does not even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act–let alone accomplish 
that much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.”87  In its reasoning, the 
Court depended on its substantial precedent to further push the favorability of 
arbitration agreements in the employment context as well as many other areas.88  This 
holding bolstered the Court’s growing precedent on the favorability of arbitration 
agreements in all contexts, but specifically in the employment context. The dissent 
in Epic Systems takes a different approach, following the arguments previously 
discussed in each dissent within the established precedent.  
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg, emphatically stated, “[t]he Court 
today subordinates employee-protective labor legislation to the Arbitration Act.”89  
To support this contention the dissent addressed: (1) the history and purpose behind 
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82 See id.  
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89 Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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the NLRA; (2) the errors in the majority’s reasoning as applied to the case at hand; 
and (3) attacked the line of precedent the majority cited.  
First, the dissent addressed the history and purpose of the NLRA.  When 
enacted, the NLRA and other labor related acts attempted to confront the growing 
issue of imbalance in the American workplace.90  The dissent reminded the majority 
and the reader that the employees in the case at hand are not arguing that the NLRA 
was violated because they were denied a judicial forum, but rather in the forum 
provided, they were denied the right to act collectively.91  It is exactly this type of 
employer conduct that Congress attempted to thwart with the passage of this Act.92  
In support of this, the dissent offered a collection of cases in which the NLRB had 
held that the NLRA “safeguards employees from employer interference” when 
asserting collective or concerted actions.93  
Disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of the NLRA, the dissent 
explained that, “joining hands in litigation” is exactly the “similar nature” supported 
by the statute.94  Furthermore, the dissent disagrees with the idea that the employees 
cannot maintain this action under the NLRA because it does not discuss the 
procedures of class action.95  Instead, as the employees argued, the NLRA 
established the right to act in concerted effort under “generally applicable 
procedures.”96  It is that right that the FAA should not overcome.97   
The dissent raised issues of policy and growing concerns for the American 
worker and their rights.  Prior to the Supreme Court delivering its decision, scholars 
and commentators alike ruminated on the possible effects this decision could have 
on workers’ rights and employer readiness to adopt mandatory arbitration into 
employment agreements.98  In a report on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute, 
Alexander Colvin argued that 
if the Court sides with the employers’ arguments in these cases, this will signal to 
businesses that the last potential barrier to their ability to opt out of class actions has 
been removed.  This would likely encourage businesses to adopt mandatory 
employment arbitration and class action waivers even more widely.99 
II. A HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made it unlawful for 
an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
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religion, sex, or national origin.”100  This momentous legislation, meant to protect 
minorities from unlawful discrimination, nearly did not include the word “sex.”101  
The amendment to the bill was a last minute introduction by Congressman Howard 
Smith of Virginia, who some believe proposed the amendment as a way to torpedo 
the bill by giving women equal rights.102  This did not prove true; the bill was enacted 
and during the first year of enforcement nearly one-third of all claims brought to the 
newly created Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were sex-based.103 
Title VII allows for employees to bring claims of workplace discrimination 
based on a variety of legal theories including race, color, religion, national origin, 
and sex-based discrimination. Sex-based discrimination during this period was 
considered actionable in cases where men and women were treated differently 
regarding issues such as hiring, firing, and other terms of employment.104  It was not 
until the 1970s that activists and scholars alike began to address the issue of sexual 
harassment claims as actionable sex-based discrimination.105  Following this, the 
EEOC issued a set of “Guidelines on Discrimination Based on Sex” which included 
guidance on sexual harassment claims.  The EEOC guidelines explained: 
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.  Unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of 
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct 
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's 
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used 
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct 
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment.106 
The two types of harassment stated in the statute are more commonly referred 
to as “quid pro quo,” which is characterized as sexual advances or requests in return 
for favorable employment benefits or promise against unfavorable employment 
benefits; and “hostile environment,” the creation of a work environment permeated 
with “degrading or sexualized content that had the purpose or effect of causing a 
hostile, intimidating, or offensive environment that affected the conditions of 
employment.”107 
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The Framework for Sexual Harassment Claims 
Six years after the EEOC released its guidelines on sexual harassment, the 
Supreme Court decided its first case on the issue of workplace sexual harassment in 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion for 
the Court, held that workplace sexual harassment was an actionable claim for sex-
based discrimination under Title VII.108  During her employment at Meritor Savings 
Bank, Mechelle Vinson was subjected to repeated forms of workplace sexual 
harassment.109  Vinson claimed that over the four years of her employment her 
supervisor Sidney Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors both during and 
after business hours, fondled her in front other employees, exposed himself to her, 
and forcibly raped her on multiple occasions.110  After notifying Taylor that she 
planned to take indefinite sick leave, she was fired.111   
Based on these and other facts, the District Court found that she was not a victim 
of sexual harassment and did not have a claim for discrimination.112  Furthermore, 
the court found that even if there were a claim, the bank could not be held liable for 
the actions of Taylor without actual notice of his behaviors.113  The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia reversed the lower court’s decision holding that the 
claims brought by Vinson were sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment 
claim for sex-based discrimination.114   
Upon granting certiorari, the Court discussed and adopted the framework in 
which a claim for workplace sexual harassment can be brought. The Court swiftly 
rejected the bank’s argument that a claim can only be brought where there is tangible 
economic loss, and instead reasoned that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”115  Next, in adopting the 
definitions and framework from the EEOC guidelines, the Court addressed the two 
different types of workplace sexual harassment claims.  Beyond adopting both 
definitions of sexual harassment, the Court established that in order to bring a hostile 
environment claim, sexual harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to 
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 
environment.’”116  
Sexual harassment is actionable when the “alleged sexual advances were 
‘unwelcome’” and should not be undercut by the inquiry of whether the “actual 
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”117  This is an important distinction 
for this and many other cases: where women may “voluntarily” have relations with 
a supervisor, they can still bring claims of sexual harassment due to the “unwelcome” 
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nature of the harassment as a whole.  What is still problematic is that other factors 
beyond the incidents of harassment themselves can be considered when determining 
the “unwelcome” nature of the conduct.  The Court reasoned that “it does not follow 
that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of 
law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome.  
To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant.”118  This type of evidence can 
be used to understand the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the harassment 
to determine the unwelcomed nature.119  
While this monumental case allowed for victims to bring claims of sexual 
harassment and established a workable framework for bringing those claims, it left 
many holes for the lower courts to fill.  One significant issue that arose was the 
standard by which the hostility of a work environment was to be judged.120  Lower 
courts understandably adopted the “reasonable person” standard to objectively 
determine the hostility of the environment.121  In 1991, the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
“reasonable woman” standard for sexual harassment claims in Ellison v. Brady.122  
In doing so the court held that “a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile 
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable 
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 
employment and create an abusive working environment.”123  The court reasoned 
that the “sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to 
systematically ignore the experiences of women,” and that the standard “does not 
establish a higher level of protection for women than men.”124  In a similar vein, 
courts were required to adopt frameworks to determine whether, using the reasonable 
person standard, conduct was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work 
environment.  
These issues were addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1993 case Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc..125  The main issue addressed was “whether conduct, to be 
actionable as ‘abusive work environment’ harassment . . . must ‘seriously affect [an 
employee's] psychological well-being’ or lead the plaintiff to ‘suffe[r] injury.’”126  
The plaintiff, Teresa Harris, worked as a manager for the equipment rental company, 
Forklift Systems.  During her years of employment, she was “insulted because of her 
gender and often made the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.”127  The Court held 
that “concrete psychological harm” is not necessary to bring a claim of sexual 
harassment under Title VII.128  In support of its holding, the Court established a two-
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step framework to determine when a hostile work environment claim is actionable.  
A plaintiff has an actionable claim when, conduct is “severe or pervasive enough to 
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment–an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile and abusive,” and the plaintiff must 
“subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive.”129 
For years, the focus of sexual harassment claims centered around the sexual 
nature of the conduct itself.130  Courts, either explicitly or implicitly, required 
conduct to “sufficiently resemble sexual advances” or be “sufficiently motivated by 
sexual interest.”131  It was not until 1998 that the Supreme Court concluded that 
sexual harassment need not be based in sexual desire or interest to be actionable.132  
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Court held that “harassing 
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”133  The plaintiff, a male employee on an offshore 
oil rig, was repeatedly subjected to harassment by supervisors who were also male.134  
He brought his claim of workplace sexual harassment and alleged that he was 
“subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him,” was “physically 
assaulted . . . in a sexual manner,” and was threatened with rape.135  
The Court reasoned that in sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII the 
“critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not 
exposed.”136  The Court explained that: 
A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female 
victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as 
to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of 
women in the workplace.  A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer 
direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both 
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.  Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses 
to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely 
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted “discrimina[tion] 
. . .  because of . . . sex.”137 
In a likely attempt to curb pushback on the expansion of Title VII claims to 
include sexual harassment of this nature, the Court stated that this would not turn 
Title VII into a “general civility code.”138  Additionally, the Court stated some 
troubling dicta in support of its reasoning for the requirements previously dictated to 
bring a hostile environment claim.  These requirements are, according to the Court, 
crucial and sufficient to “ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary 
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socializing in the workplace – such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual 
flirtation – for discriminatory ‘conditions of employment.’”139 
These cases took great steps to ensure the availability of Title VII protection for 
employees who experience sexual harassment in the workplace.  While each case 
may not be perfect in its reasoning and rationale, they provide the essential 
framework by which a victim may bring a claim and establish standards by which 
harassing conduct can be assessed.  
Employer Liability for Workplace Sexual Harassment 
Beyond creating a framework for claims and establishing coherent standards for 
assessing conduct, the Court established when an employer may be held liable for 
the conduct of its employees.  Initially, employer liability was not definitively 
addressed.  In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court did not adopt a rule but did 
discuss the issue.140  At the trial level the court found that the bank could not be held 
liable if it did not have notice of the conduct.141  The appellate court reversed, 
applying strict liability for claims where a supervisor created a hostile work 
environment.142  In rejecting both of these theories of liability while refusing to adopt 
a rule, the Supreme Court reasoned that “Congress wanted courts to look to agency 
principles for guidance in this area;” and that it “evinces an intent to place some 
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held 
responsible.”143 
In a pair of cases decided on the same day, the parameters of employer liability 
in sexual harassment claims were established.  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court differentiated liability for 
employers based on whether a tangible employment action was taken.144  The facts 
of the two cases differ, but their main contentions were identical.  In Faragher, the 
plaintiff worked as a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton.145  During her employment 
she was repeatedly subjected to “uninvited and offensive touching” and “lewd 
remarks,” and her supervisors often spoke of women in offensive terms.146  The city 
had adopted a sexual harassment policy in 1986, and revised it in 1990 – however, 
the city failed to disseminate the policy to all of its employees, as required, including 
those in the department where the plaintiff worked.147  The plaintiff never filed an 
official complaint with her supervisors.148  
In Ellerth, the plaintiff worked as a sales manager for Burlington Industries in 
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its Chicago office, which had only one other employee.149  Ellerth alleged that she 
was “subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor.”150  Three instances 
of harassment “could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits,” and 
therefore constituted a quid pro quo claim for harassment.151  In one such instance 
her supervisor stated, “you know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy 
at Burlington.”152 
The Court established a framework to determine when an employer can be held 
liable for the actions of its employees, which included an affirmative defense for 
employers to escape liability.  The first step questions whether or not a tangible 
employment action was taken.153  The Court held that “tangible employment action 
taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer,” and 
the employer is therefore liable.154  If no such action is taken, an employer is “subject 
to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment 
created by a supervisor with immediate . . .  authority over the employee.”155  In 
applying the common-law principles of agency liability the Court reasoned an 
employer can be held vicariously liable for “some tortious conduct of a supervisor 
made possible by abuse of his supervisory authority.”156 
The inquiry of liability does not end there. In cases where no tangible 
employment actions are taken, the employer can assert an affirmative defense against 
liability.157  To avoid liability an employer must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that “(a) [] the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) [] the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”158  In Faragher, the Court 
reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the District Court ruling, holding that 
the City could be held vicariously liable for the actions taken by supervisory 
employees.159  In Ellerth, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, and held on 
remand that Burlington Industries could still be subject to vicarious liability.160 
III. MANDATORY ARBITRATION TODAY–ITS PREVALENCE AND EFFECT 
This part will discuss the landscape of mandatory arbitration agreements in the 
American workplace.  This data analysis sets the background on which the Supreme 
Court’s decisions take place and reflects the real-world effects of those decisions.  It 
will begin with a look at the timeline of the rise in use of mandatory arbitration over 
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the past few decades.  Next, it will discuss the statistical studies of exactly how many 
millions of Americans are subject to these types of agreements, and of which those 
agreements consist.  And finally, it will discuss the outcomes of private arbitration 
and the differences between those outcomes and their judicial counterparts.  
The Buildup to Mandatory Arbitration 
As Part I discussed, the Supreme Court has played a major role in the 
development of the law around mandatory arbitration agreements, especially those 
contained in employment agreements.  When passed in 1925, no one believed that 
the FAA was meant to apply to employment agreements.161  In fact, it was not until 
the Court’s decision in Gilmer–although not explicitly an employment decision–that 
the “floodgates of mandatory employment arbitration” were opened.162  And as 
previously discussed, it was the Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores Inc. that 
definitively held that employers could force employees to arbitrate claims, and that 
those clauses would be upheld by the full force of the FAA.163   
Prior to these decisions, mandatory arbitration clauses were rarely used in the 
employment context for nearly seventy-five years.  After these decisions, starting in 
the late 1980s to early 1990s, scholars and researchers noticed the trend of increased 
use of these agreements.  The issue for many scholars has been the availability of 
data to conduct accurate studies on the trend.164  Studies show a very distinct picture: 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts are here to stay and growing 
by the minute. 
Pure Numbers 
As one researcher pointed out, “there is no requirement that employers who 
require their employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements report this to a 
government agency such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics.”165  Due to this lack of 
required reporting, most statistical reports on arbitration in employment contracts 
have been completed through academic surveys.166  
In the years immediately following the opening of the floodgates, it was reported 
that in non-union workplaces, 2.1% of employees were subject to arbitration 
agreements.167  Just three years later this statistic more than tripled; as of 1995, the 
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United States General Accounting Office (“GOA”) released a report stating that 
nearly 7.6% of Americans were subject to mandatory arbitration under their 
employment contracts.168  A 2003 study by Alexander Colvin of the 
telecommunications industry concluded that 14.1% of the employers in the industry 
had adopted mandatory arbitration agreement, which covered “22.7 percent of the 
nonunion workforce.”169  
Alexander Colvin and the Economic Policy Institute completed a study on the 
pervasiveness of arbitration agreements.170  Conducted in 2017, the study reflected 
the continued rapid growth of the use of these agreements.  The study revealed that 
“53.9 percent of nonunion private sector employers have mandatory arbitration 
procedures.”171  That number increased to 65.1% when looking solely at employers 
with a thousand or more employees.172  For employees, this means that 56.2% of the 
nonunion private sector workforce is subject to these agreements, totaling 60.1 
million American workers. 173  More specifically, 30.1% of those agreements contain 
class action waivers, limiting the employees right to bring collective action in federal 
courts.174 
So, what do all these numbers really mean?  First, they show the massive impact 
that arbitration agreements have on the American worker.  Second, they provide a 
colorful background for the Supreme Court’s ever-growing precedent favoring 
mandatory arbitration.  Additionally, there is often little awareness of the sheer 
amount of people affected by these agreements, and the drastic impact they have on 
an employee’s right to bring employment-related claims.175  People often do not 
realize they have effectively lost their ability to bring claims based on “Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.”176  The next Part will discuss, in 
relation to the number of workers under arbitration agreement, how these same 
workers fare when it comes to using those procedures.  
The Outcome – Fair or Foul? 
While some scholars have attempted to gather information on the prevalence of 
arbitration agreements within employment contracts, others have looked to the 
effects of those agreements.  This sub-part will first discuss the effects on the number 
of claims brought under arbitration agreements compared to their judicial 
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counterparts.  Additionally, it will discuss the disparities in outcomes between 
judicially litigated employment claims and arbitrated claims, and what some scholars 
believe to be the cause of these disparities, in number and outcome.   
Scholars have struggled to gather empirical data on mandatory arbitration due 
to its private nature.  Recent studies have addressed the past issues with collecting 
data, and in turn have found representative samples to on which to conduct empirical 
studies.177  With that, it is essential to remember that much more still needs to be 
accomplished in this realm when it comes to comparing arbitration to litigation.178  
The recent studies completed by scholars have attempted to breach the surface of 
these comparisons and have drawn some conclusions that are helpfully applicable to 
this topic.179 
A recent study completed by Professor Cynthia Estlund, of New York 
University School of Law, discussed the comparison between the number of 
employment claims brought to arbitration and those which are litigated within the 
judicial system.180  In 2016, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), 
reported that a total of 2879 employment related claims were brought to arbitration 
under employer-promulgated procedures.181  This suggests “that about 5126 cases 
were filed in arbitration by . . .  employees who are covered by MAAs [mandatory 
arbitration agreements].”182  In comparison, the relevant and comparable number of 
claims brought in federal courts for 2016 totaled around 26,300 claims.183  
Calculating the difference, based on proportionality of the workforce covered by 
MAAs and the downward deviation of federal claims, the author estimated that there 
were anywhere from 9600 to 28,400 missing arbitration claims in 2016.184  The 
author proposed a possible explanation for this large discrepancy throughout the 
article and the effects those have on individual plaintiffs, but this subject will be 
discussed later in Part IV.  
Beyond the sheer number of “missing” arbitrations, scholars have looked to the 
differences in outcomes and awards of arbitration compared to traditional 
litigation.185  In 2011, a study discussed the disparity between plaintiff win rates and 
awards in arbitration as opposed to litigation counterparts.186  This study used data 
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collected from the AAA after it was required to disclose a variety of information on 
its procedures and outcomes in order to comply with changes in the California Code 
requirements.187  Due to the comprehensive nature of the disclosures required, the 
author was able to access data on a national scale.  
Breaking down these findings into win rates and award amounts, the study 
carefully analyzed the differences between arbitration and litigation.  First, looking 
to the win rate, the author found that “the employees won 260 of the 1,213 cases in 
the AAA-CC filings which terminated in an award, corresponding to an employee 
win rate of 21.4 percent.”188  This is compared to 33% to 36% win rate in federal 
employment discrimination cases, and 50% to 60% employee win rate in state 
courts.189  While more research must be conducted to determine the different factors 
that led to this gap in win rates, these number do “indicate[] that there exists an 
arbitration-litigation gap.”190 
Beyond win rates, the study analyzed the differences in award amounts between 
litigation and arbitration. In the 260 arbitration outcomes that resulted in monetary 
damages awards, the study found that the median award amount was $36,500 and 
the mean award was $109,858.191  In comparison, the author used previous studies 
on federal and state employment related litigation to determine the median and mean 
amount of awards granted.192  The study found that the median award amount for 
federal discrimination cases was $150,500.193 Taking inflation into consideration to 
properly compare the studies, the author calculated that this median award would 
have equaled $176,426 in 2005 – the chosen midpoint year of the AAA-CC filings 
used in the author’s study.194  Again cautioning the comparison of “oranges and 
apples,” the author made a point of the striking differences between median 
awards.195  Comparing the outcomes, the “median awards in employment litigation 
are around 5-10 times greater than median awards in employment arbitration.”196   
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While the causes of these gaps in both win rates and award amounts are still 
relatively unknown, due to the inherent differences in the resolution methods, it is 
important to remember that this difference does exists and affects those who must 
follow these procedures.  The author of the above discussed study and others have 
attempted to suggest possible explanations for these apparent differences. Colvin, 
and at least one other author, suggested that one explanation may be what is called 
the “repeat player issue.”197   
This explanation draws a correlation between the win and award rates of 
employers who are repeat players in the arbitration system. More specifically, this 
and other studies have looked to repeat pairings of employers and arbitrators.198  In 
the data provided by the AAA-CC filings, Colvin found that 15.9% of cases involved 
repeat pairings of employers and arbitrators.199  The employee win rate for these 
pairings was only 12%, with a mean award amount of $7451.200  The author 
concludes that “the results indicate that there is a strong repeat employer effect in 
employment arbitration and a smaller, but significant repeat employer-arbitrator 
pairing effect.”201  
The differences discovered in this collection of studies should be viewed in a 
way that also takes into account the Supreme Court’s growing precedent favoring 
arbitration.  The Court has continued to hold strong to the idea that under its 
precedent, so long as arbitration agreements are validly entered into by both parties, 
they should be upheld under the FAA.  With the growing use of mandatory 
arbitration in employment, it is likely that more employees will begin to see the 
differences in win rates and awards that have been discussed in these studies.  
Assuming that a subset of all claims brought through arbitration under discrimination 
statutes are sexual harassment claims, these results also show that women – and men 
for that matter – who bring these claims could be encountering a difficult process to 
receive inadequate vindication for their claims of sexual harassment in the 
workplace.  
IV. #METOO: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
The History of #MeToo 
Most people believe that the “Me Too” movement began with a simple tweet.  
On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano tweeted the following:  
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Suggested by a friend: if all the women who have been sexually harassed and 
assaulted wrote “me too” as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude 
of the problem.  If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write “me too” as a 
reply to this tweet.202 
 
Within twenty-four hours, the hashtag Me Too was shared over five hundred 
thousand times on Twitter and twelve million times on Facebook.203  Women across 
the country and the globe began to tell their stories of sexual harassment and assault 
and doing so in a way that captured the attention of the world. Over the next year, 
this movement gained traction throughout most major media outlets.  Time Magazine 
named the “Silence Breakers,” – a group of women, including actresses, 
farmworkers, housekeepers, and hospital workers, who spoke out against sexual 
harassment and assault – “Person of the Year” in 2017.204  
Interestingly enough, the Me Too Movement began long before October 15th, 
2017.  The movement was originally started in 2006 by Tarana Burke, who at the 
time was a youth worker, working predominantly with children of color.205  She 
explained that the movement started “in the deepest, darkest place in my soul.”206  
After hearing about the devastating incidents of sexual violence one young girl had 
experienced, Burke explained “I watched her put her mask back on and go back into 
the world like she was all alone and I couldn’t even bring myself to whisper… me 
too.”207  From there, Burke and other women like her initially started the Me Too 
movement to help survivors of sexual violence, particularly focusing on women of 
color and those from low-income communities.208 
While much different from the scope and aims of the original movement, the 
most recent iteration of the movement brought a different issue to the forefront: 
sexual harassment in the workplace.  Much of the focus of harassment in the 
workplace began at the “top,” meaning those in high-profile positions such as 
actresses and news commentators.  Gaining the most notoriety, the accusers of 
Harvey Weinstein have continued to speak out against sexual harassment and 
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assault.209  After an investigative report completed by the New York Times, it was 
revealed that the famous and widely successful film director had been paying off 
those who had accused him of sexual harassment with large sums of money for over 
three decades.210 
Actress Ashley Judd, who was one of the first women to speak out publicly 
against Harvey Weinstein, recounted her experiences in the Time Magazine cover 
story.211  She explained that in 1997, Weinstein called her to a Beverly Hills hotel 
for a meeting. This meeting ended after Ms. Judd refused his sexual advances and 
“attempt[s] to coerce her into bed.”212  Even more astonishing than Weinstein’s 
actions was the response she received from a screenwriter friend.  He explained to 
her Weinstein's behavior was an “open secret passed around on the whisper network 
that had been furrowing through Hollywood for years [and that i]t allowed for people 
to warn others to some degree, but there was no route to stop the abuse.”213  The 
more women that spoke out, the more people paid attention.  This included the board 
of directors of the Weinstein Company, who eventually fired Weinstein, just days 
after the allegations began to pile up.214  
But as the Time Magazine article highlights, it is not only those at the top who 
were experiencing sexual harassment and assault in the workplace.215  Women from 
all fields and occupations experience some type of sexual harassment. The article 
details the plight of seven Plaza Hotel employees, who filed suit against the hotel for 
sexual harassment.216  These women are forced to work with their harassers each day 
because they could not afford to leave their jobs.217  The article continues to discuss 
the issue of sexual harassment in the fields of technology, academia, medicine, 
farming, customer service, and politics.218   
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace – Studies and Effects  
Even without the revelation of sexual harassment in the workplace being spread 
across the world by the Me Too movement, the world, or at least the United States, 
could have realized and attacked this issue much sooner.  In June of 2016, over a 
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year before the tweet heard across the world, the EEOC released a task force study 
on sexual harassment in the workplace.219  This study revealed the staggering extent 
of harassment in the American workplace. 220  While its focus was on all types of 
workplace harassment, the study specifically addressed the issue of sexual 
harassment.221 
The EEOC realized that addressing the problem of workplace sexual harassment 
was more difficult than it initially appeared.  Looking to testimony and academic 
articles, the EEOC found that “anywhere from 25% to 85% of women reported 
experiencing some type of sexual harassment in the workplace.” 222  The study drew 
from the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (“SEQ”), which is “the most widely used 
survey of harassment of women at work.”223  This questionnaire breaks down the 
different types of harassment experienced in the workplace.  It asks respondents 
whether they have experienced sexual harassment in the form of unwanted sexual 
attention or sexual coercion, and also if they have experienced “gender 
harassment.”224  The study found that when using this type of breakdown, “almost 
60% of women report having experienced sexual harassment” and that gender 
harassment is the most common form of harassment.225   
Understanding that a larger portion of the working population experiences some 
type of sexual harassment in the workplace, one would think that reporting such 
experiences would be equally as common.  This is not the case.  One study cited in 
the EEOC report found that “gender harassing conduct was almost never reported; 
unwanted physical touching was formally reported only 8% of the time; and sexually 
coercive behavior was reported by only 30% of the women who experienced it.”226  
More than an awareness of the sheer amount of harassing behaviors that occur 
in the workplace is needed to understand the impact these actions have on society.  
Because these incidents occur in the workplace, they have a great effect on the 
economic security of women.  In addition to an economic effect, victims of 
workplace harassment experience a range of physical and psychological impacts.  In 
comparing these effects to the number of women, it quickly becomes obvious that 
these behaviors have an adverse effect on society as a whole.  
It is increasingly important to understand the economic impact sexual 
harassment can have on victims.  For years, scholars have researched the effects of 
sexism on women’s earning capacities.  The male-female wage gap has largely 
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remained unchanged for decades, and many have recognized that occupational 
segregation in the workforce is a “strong contributor to this earnings inequality.”227  
With the ever-increasing discussion of workplace sexual harassment, scholars have 
now begun to research the economic impacts that victims experience.  
Three university professors completed a study and analyzed the economic 
impact that sexual harassment had on women ages twenty-nine to thirty-one.228  This 
study discussed the impact that incidences can have on financial stress, usually 
caused by changes in employment, which can affect the attainment goals of a 
woman’s career.229  Women who experience sexual harassment in the workplace are 
far more likely to experience financial stress than those who are not targets.230  The 
cause of this financial stress is that targets of these behaviors will, instead of 
reporting and some after reporting, change employment. The study showed that 
between 2003 and 2005, targets of sexual harassment are “6.5 times as likely than 
nontargets to change jobs.”231  In one interview, a woman named Lisa explained, “I 
had one month off. I quit, and I didn’t have a job. That’s it, I’m outta here. I’ll eat 
rice and live in the dark if I have to.”232 
Beyond the challenge of having to find new employment, this study looked to 
the long-term effect those changes had on women’s earning capacity and general 
productivity.  Women who leave their employment due to sexual harassment are 
often forced to accept less-prestigious, lower paying jobs which often supply fewer 
hours.233  Women who remain at their employment also experience losses in earning 
capacity due to workplace culture and limitations.  Hannah, an employee at an 
internet advertising agency explained that over the years, because she refused to 
participate in the misogynistic culture promoted by her co-worker and supervisor, 
she was continuously looked over for promotions.234  Lisa aptly articulated that in 
her role within a company with a toxic work-culture, “I would never become friends 
with these people, my boss would never be a mentor, I would never, you know, have 
any relationship with these people. So that was rough and finally I just quit.”235 
The economic effects of harassment have been noticed by many outside the 
realm of academia and has been addressed by various news outlets. A Harvard 
Business Review article painted a disturbing picture of the impact harassment can 
have on the economy as a whole.  The author explained: 
as people drop out, opt out, and tune out of their chosen fields, it affects the whole 
economy.  It’s the missing female Harvey Weinstein who never got a chance to 
shape the full range of stories of our society.  It’s the female Charlie Rose who never 
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got a chance to earn the power and influence associated with that role.  And moving 
away from the hypothetical, it’s the Susan Fowlers and Ellen Paos who didn’t get to 
build the companies or make the investments that offered the new solutions that 
society most desperately needs.236 
While it is difficult to quantify the actual impact that these behaviors are having 
on the economy, it is not difficult to grasp a general understanding of the impact.  
When a large portion of the workforce is not able to contribute new and fresh ideas 
and innovations, the economy as a whole greatly suffers.237   
Beyond an economic impact, women who experience sexual harassment in the 
workplace suffer both physically and psychologically.  Studies continue to show that 
women who experience everyday sexist encounters are more likely to be “associated 
with greater anger, anxiety, and depression.”238  Furthermore, women who 
experience these behaviors are more likely to find less “satisfaction with one’s job 
and professional relationships, loss of productivity, and increased turnover intentions 
and behaviors.”239  As far as physical issues, women who suffer sexual harassment 
can experience “muscle aches, headaches, or even chronic health problems such as 
high blood pressure and problems with blood sugar.”240 
A more abstract theory of the effects of sexual harassment on society as a whole 
addresses the idea of missing human capital.  The best way to understand this theory 
is by example.  In December of 2017, Heidi Bond accused now former Judge Alex 
Kozinski of sexual harassment.241  Judge Kozinski was a prominent judge in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose clerkship positions were highly coveted by 
those dreaming of one day clerking at the Supreme Court.242  During her year-long 
clerkship, Heidi Bond was regularly subjected to sexual harassment by the now 
former judge.  In a blog post, Bond explained that during the year, Judge Kozinski 
had showed her porn saved to his computer, asked if it turned her on, revealed his 
list of female “conquests,” and during her first day in his chambers referred to her as 
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his “slave.”243 
Bond also explained the impact this harassment had on her physically, 
emotionally, and professionally:  
The worry took its toll.  I began waking from sleep, heart racing, hearing imaginary 
double beeps summoning me to his office.  I started not being able to sleep at all.  
By the time I left the clerkship, there were nights I would lie in bed and watch the 
darkened ceiling until I had to get up and go back to work.  I stopped being able to 
complete even basic tasks—I left the clerkship as one of the most incompetent clerks 
ever to grace Kozinski’s chambers, and I’m fairly certain that when I started I was 
not one of his most incompetent clerks.  I gained something like forty pounds over 
the last six months of the clerkship.244 
So why stay, you ask? Bond provided a few responses, some quite disturbing. 
Bond explained that not only did she have a hundred thousand dollars of student loan 
debt and little savings, she believed that due to judicial confidentiality she would 
never be able to share her experiences with anyone else.245   
After her clerkship with Judge Kozinski, Bond went on to clerk for the Supreme 
Court Justices O’Connor and Kennedy before becoming a law professor.246  But 
Heidi Bond is no longer a member of the legal profession; she is a published novelist 
who writes books where “women win.”247  It is this loss of a great legal mind that 
Amanda Taub insists is the dire effect of sexual harassment.  In her New York Times 
article, she discusses the impact a single harasser can have on a “generation of 
women.”248  By habitually subjecting female clerks to sexual harassment, Judge 
Kozinski limited the options of many high-achieving female law graduates. One 
professor explained that she would not write letters of recommendation for women, 
fearing they would be subjected to harassing behaviors.249  Another female attorney 
explained that “everyone knew, and women didn’t apply to clerk for Judge Kozinski 
despite his prestige and connections to the Supreme Court.  I always felt the men 
who took their places were traitors.”250 
Imagine how many women were denied an opportunity to participate in a career-
alerting experience.  And furthermore, how many others were not and instead 
subjected to harassment, poisoning their views about the world around them.  As 
Taub states: 
Conversely, how many of the men who were able to clerk for Judge Kozinski 
without having to worry about their own safety went on to be role models for other 
men?  And how many concluded that their female colleagues fell behind because 
they just didn’t have what it takes, not because they had been effectively cut off 
                                                                                                     
243 Heidi Bond, Me Too, COURTNEYMILAN.COM (Dec. 8, 2017), 
http://www.courtneymilan.com/metoo/kozinski.html [https://perma.cc/9R7W-EBZ5]. 
244 Id.  
245 Id.  
246 Taub, supra note 241.  Bond explained that the process of applying for teaching positions was 
difficult because she was constantly reminded of the trauma experienced in Kozinski’s chambers. Id. 
247 Bond, supra note 243. 
248 Taub, supra note 241.  
249 Id.  
250 Id.  
446 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
from certain opportunities?251 
This is just one story, out of many, explaining the effects that sexual harassment 
in the workplace can have on those who experience it.  It is important to take a 
holistic view of the effects of harassment to fully understand its effect on victims and 
society.  A greater understanding of these issues will only help to spread awareness 
and support.  
IV. THE SOLUTIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION 
Mandatory Arbitration’s Effect on Sexual Harassment Claims 
With a general understanding of the law of both mandatory arbitration and 
sexual harassment claims, it is essential to comprehend how these two paths lead to 
a troubling intersection for the victims.  As the Supreme Court was gearing up to 
decide Epic Systems v. Lewis, many around the country began to notice that this case 
could have a damaging effect on the Me Too movement.  As one reporter explained,  
[m]ost women cite fear of retaliation as the biggest reason for not reporting 
harassment or assault by superiors in the workplace.  Forcing women to litigate each 
of these cases individually in private arbitration will make retaliation even easier and 
more likely.  Instead of women having strength in numbers and being able to come 
together to sue, women will be forced to go it alone in private arbitration.252 
Due to the hushed nature of arbitration, other have noted that “[t]here’s no 
transparency in most binding arbitration agreements and they often include 
nondisclosure provisions.”253   
An example of this issue played out in front of the country in 2016 when 
Gretchen Carlson tried to bring a claim in court against her former boss, Roger 
Ailes.254  Because of an arbitration clause contained in her Fox News contract, 
Ailes’s attorney argued that Carlson was required to bring her claim to arbitration.255  
The arbitration clause required that “all filings, evidence and testimony connected 
with the arbitration, and all relevant allegations and events leading up to the 
arbitration, shall be held in strict confidence.”256  While Ailes and Fox News 
eventually settled the case,257 for a moment the world became aware of the harsh 
impact arbitration agreements have on employee claims of sexual harassment.  
The EEOC in 2016 also released a review of its systemic program, which is 
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charged with attacking systemic discrimination in employment nationwide.  In this 
report, they addressed the issues that mandatory arbitration has on claims of 
discrimination in the workplace.  Not only do these agreements “prevent employees 
from learning about similar concerns shared by others in their workplace and . . .  
impede the development of the law,” they can also hide these employment practices 
from the public eye and decrease employer accountability for following the law.258   
Once in the arbitration system, as already discussed, it can be extremely difficult 
for plaintiffs to succeed on their claims and recover damages.  This difficulty is 
enhanced by the framework under which victims must bring their claims.  As 
discussed above, to bring a claim of sexual harassment, even in arbitration, a plaintiff 
must show that they were subjected to sexual harassment that was severe and 
pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment.259  Recent studies 
show that the type of harassment most women encounter in the workforce is not 
overtly sexual in nature, but rather gender harassment.  This is not the type of 
harassment likely envisioned when the law surrounding sexual harassment was 
created.  There has been little advancement on how the courts determine what is 
considered severe and pervasive, and it has proven to be a high standard.260  
Federal Legislation: “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act” and 
“Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act” 
As the Supreme Court and many other courts have made abundantly clear, 
changes in how we deal with mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims are 
not going to come from changes in the established jurisprudence. Any type of change 
in how we deal with this massively important issue must come by way of legislative 
action.  
In 2017, four female congresswomen introduced a bill to address this issue. The 
“Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act” (“H.R. 4734”) if enacted 
would require that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable 
if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.” 261  The bill defines 
“predispute arbitration” as “any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that had not yet 
arisen at the time of the making of the agreement;” and sex discrimination dispute as 
“a dispute between an employer and employee arising out of conduct that would 
form the basis of a claim based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.”262   
 One of its sponsors, Pramila Jayapal, after introducing the bill to Congress in 
December of 2017, was interviewed on what she believes to be the important aspects 
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of the bill and its fundamental importance as a whole.263  Representative Jayapal 
explained that the bill would allow for victims of workplace harassment to have a 
choice of venue in which to bring their claims, allowing them to file with the EEOC 
and subsequently a lawsuit.264  When asked about the Me Too movement she 
explained that this bill would help facilitate the goals of MeToo:  
MeToo is not just about the final act of assault, and the final big act of harassment, 
it’s about all the ways in which women get discriminated against, or get diminished, 
or demeaned that frankly are part of a culture that then lead to that sexual assault 
and sexual violence.  And so I think that it has been useful in having people start to 
think about all these things as being connected.265 
Representative Jayapal explained that it was surprisingly easy to garner support for 
this bill, which pleasantly surprised her.266  
Understanding the need for legislation, a letter was sent to the leaders of both 
the House and the Senate by the National Association of Attorneys General, signed 
by every state attorney general in the nation, encouraging both to take action.267  In 
this letter the Association addressed the major issues with these agreements 
explaining: their limitation to the fundamental right of access to the judicial system; 
the lack of employee awareness of such agreements; the increased secrecy such 
agreements introduce; and the ability for Congress to help change the “culture of 
silence that protects perpetrators at the cost of their victims.”268  They urged Congress 
to act promptly to address the issues by passing legislation that has already been 
introduced.269  In addition to some issues with support in Congress, a general apathy 
by the public and a vocal minority disfavoring any change on the topic will likely 
slow the momentum of these acts.270   
Although little progress was made with H.R. 4734 in the 115th Congress, in 
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2019 the “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act” was introduced.271 
The language of the bill tracks that of the original introduced in 2017.272  Originally 
sponsored by Representatives Stefankik, Jayapal, and Griffith, the bill is now 
supported by fifteen representatives from both political parties.273   
Once passed, this law will likely still need to overcome legal challenges to its 
enactment and enforcement. As the Supreme Court stated in Epic Systems v. Lewis, 
it will continue to uphold arbitration agreements until Congress makes a “clear and 
manifest congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act and outlaw 
[arbitration] agreements like [these].”274  It is important to note that the Court did 
provide examples where Congress has made clear and manifest demands within 
statutes, including whistleblower protection statutes, motor vehicle franchise 
contracts, and creditor protections for military members.275  
It would undoubtedly be difficult to argue that this proposed legislation does not 
make “clear and manifest commands” to displace the Arbitration Act as it applies to 
the arbitration of sexual harassment claims made by employees.  This statute, with 
direct language prohibiting such agreements, is more akin to the statues reference by 
the Court in Epic Systems which manifested clear commands than the FLSA which 
was at issue in the case.  Using the Courts own reasoning, Congress “does not alter 
the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague or ancillary provisions – it 
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”276  On the contrary, this 
statute does not attempt to “hide elephants in mouseholes.”  This statute makes a 
loud and clear demand by Congress that agreements which contain requirements 
forcing the arbitration of sexual harassment claims brought by employees will no 
longer be tolerated in this country.  
Since H.R. 1443 re-introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual 
Harassment Act, two Democratic senators introduced the Forced Arbitration 
Injustice Repeal Act (“FAIR Act”).277  While not specifically targeted at sexual 
harassment, this bill would invalidate arbitration agreements contained in both 
employment and consumer contracts.278  As stated in the bill, the purpose of the FAIR 
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Act is to  
(1) prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of future 
employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes; and (2) prohibit 
agreements and practices that interfere with the right of individuals, workers, and 
small businesses to participate in a joint, class, or collective action related to an 
employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute.279 
Not only would it prohibit companies and employers from including predispute 
arbitration agreements in future employment and consumer contracts, it invalidates 
any pre-existing clauses contained in these contracts.280  This bill was passed by the 
House on September 20, 2019, by a 225 to 186 vote.281  It has since been referred to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, where no actions has been taken.282 
State Legislation 
Various states around the country have attempted to eliminate the use of 
mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims.  States that already passed 
legislation include Maryland, New York, Vermont and Washington.283 After the 
California State Legislature passed a bill limiting this use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses, its Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, claiming that it violated federal 
law.284 
Governor Brown’s concerns are not unfounded.  The Court’s decision in Epic 
Systems could have an impact on the effectiveness of these bills and could possibly 
be the grounds for finding them unenforceable.285  As the Court stated, parroting its 
holding and reasoning of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the FAA preempts 
state laws which attempt to make arbitration agreements illegal for any other reason 
other than traditional contractual defense.286  Because these law attempt to override 
the FAA in ways beyond which it allows, the Concepcion and Epic Systems 
reasonings could prove to be any state legislation’s downfall.  
CONCLUSION 
When considering the reasons why Americans should find the ending of 
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims to be an important topic in 
employment policy, remember the numbers. There are currently tens of millions of 
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Americans employed who are subjected to mandatory arbitration through 
employment agreements and policies. On top of that, as many as eighty percent of 
women, who make up just about fifty percent of the workforce, have experienced 
some type of sexual harassment in the workplace. This creates an outstandingly high 
number of women who, when bringing claims of sexual harassment, are forced to 
arbitrate these claims individually and cloaked with secrecy. Beyond the number of 
people who may bring these claims, the results of arbitration, as discussed earlier in 
both success of claims and amount of rewards, show a strong favoring of employers 
over employees.  
After considering the numbers, it is essential to remember that courts have made 
it abundantly clear that mandatory arbitration clauses contained in employment 
agreements are here to stay. This leads to one logical solution of these issues: 
legislation. From here, it is the job of Congress to ensure protections for employees 
who are not only subjected to sexual harassment at work, but who are then forced to 
bring their claims to a system that it likely setting them up for failure. Until Congress 
fulfils this duty to protect its constituents, it is important for those constituents who 
feel strongly to show their support. Through perception and awareness this issue can 
be addressed and solved.  
 
